A Guest Response from Malin Freeborn on the Moral Argument (Part 2 of 2)

[Note: This is a continuation of a conversation involving atheist philosophy graduate Malin Freeborn and myself (Jonathan McLatchie) regarding the moral argument for the existence of God. This is part 2 of 2 of Malin's rebuttal to my first response. This response deals with my objections to his arguments from Scripture. For Malin's first guest post, see here. For my response, see here. For part 1 of Malin's rebuttal, see here. For my response to part 1 of Malin's rebuttal, see here.] 

It has been claimed that whether or not we can glean our moral knowledge from scripture is entirely missing Mayer’s point, that the subject he discusses in moral ontology rather than moral epistemology.  However, while scripture is not itself the ontological foundation of ethics, any theory of morality must provide some account of morality which goes beyond ‘Morality is the character traits of God, whatever those may be’.  It must provide concrete moral statements which must then be accountable themselves to reason and common sense.  Theological moral injunctions and their sources are not reasonable, and for this reason we must have a good look at the source - in Meyer’s case the Bible.

This system does not, on the whole, provide a usable ethical system.  It is not an answer to any moral problems, it is nothing but a signpost.  The apologist’s ethics simply point beyond.

Question: What is right to do and wrong to do?

Answer: The actions and character are good.

Q: What are they?
A: We can know them through the Bible.
Q: Then I shall look at the Bible.

A: I’m afraid you can’t read anything in the Bible without my commentaries.

Simply put, it seems to me that the apologist has a set of ethics and then attempts to back them up with scripture.  Anyone who follows the ethics of a religious person cannot know the character or voice of their god, so they must either become an apologist to determine their own reading of scripture, or they must put their faith in an apologist and do what the apologist says.

A Rebuttal to Malin Freeborn on the Moral Argument

[Note: This is a continuation of a conversation involving atheist philosophy graduate Malin Freeborn and myself (Jonathan McLatchie) regarding the moral argument for the existence of God. This is my response to part 1 of Malin's rebuttal. Part 2 of Malin's response (which will touch on my objections to his arguments from Scripture) will be released subsequently. For Malin's first guest post, see here. For my response, see here. For his first rebuttal, see here.]

Revisiting Euthyphro's Dilemma

Malin writes,

The problem [with the moral argument] is twofold.  Firstly, we can derive morals without this argument.  Secondly, this argument does not in fact give us a solid foundation for morals.  Yahweh may be unchanging, but even if he existed, this would not be enough.  Imagine for a moment that I find a rock and carve into it a set of injunctions - this rock now contains ‘Do not steal’, ‘Do not kill’, ‘Do not put anchovies nor pineapple on pizzas’, ‘Do not disrespect the rock’, et c.  Now imagine that the rock is timeless and unalterable - it will never change.  Is it a good foundation for ethics?  Certainly not, because it is arbitrary.

So we must ask - why should the character of a god be a good source for ethics?  You might say that it is because god is good.  But what is good?  How do we know that the character traits of Yahweh are in fact good?  Simply because they are Yahweh’s traits?  Because Yahweh simply is good?  It doesn’t really answer the question.

This is known as the Euthyphro dilemma, and there is no way around it because it is an exhaustive divide - if something is good and X shows it to be good, then it is either good with or without X, or it is good because of X.  We cannot escape it by saying that Yahweh’s ‘character’ rather than his words make it good.  We cannot escape it by saying that Yahweh is perfect, because we then have to ask, ‘Perfect in regards to what?’, and if the answer is ‘Perfect in regards to everything, including morals’ then we are back at square one.

Gods, if they existed, could aid our moral epistemology, but never our moral ontology.  Without gods, not everything is permitted - and this is precisely the point."

Traditionally, euthyphro's dilemma is concerned with right action, not with good simpliciter (though if that is your concern I can address that too). The question is posed this way: Is x the right thing to do because God commands it, or does God command it because its already the right thing to do? I take the former option. Normally, the problem with accepting the horn is that there is a presumption that the commands in question from God are arbitrary (i.e. God could have commanded that we ought to lie). But that's just false. The theist wants to say that God is essentially loving, honest etc., and therefore, in all worlds at which God exists, his commands are going to be consistent with his nature. And therefore, in all worlds, he will disapprove of lying. 

A Guest Response from Malin Freeborn on the Moral Argument (Part 1 of 2)

[Note: This is a continuation of a conversation involving atheist philosophy graduate Malin Freeborn and myself (Jonathan McLatchie) regarding the moral argument for the existence of God. This is part 1 of 2 of Malin's rebuttal. Part 2 of his response will touch on my objections to his arguments from Scripture. For Malin's first guest post, see here. For my response, see here.]

Seeking a Definition for Transcendental

In the previous post I requested a definition for transcendental.  I hold that the word is generally used simply for writers to hide behind,  but I’m willing to work with any definition, and a definition was given.  So here’s the new challenge, as given by Jonathan - we must find an objective standard of ethics.  An action or behaviour[1] must be wrong or right regardless of people’s opinions.

I know that objective morals, in the required sense, do in fact exist.  However, I disagree with the statement that gods exist and disagree that any god can make ethics objective which would not be objective without the god.

          
At this point, more ambiguous language is used.  Morals are ‘grounded in the moral character of God’ or have an ‘ontological foundation in god, themselves being a reflection of God’s character and attributes’.  I know how to ground a house or how to ground a lightning rod, but of course that is not what it meant.  So what is meant?  I think I see what is being pointed at, but whether or not I understand the position (or indeed, if anyone really does) this is not a good way to show that ethics are objective.

The presuppositional theists’ story seems to be something like this:

For morals to be transcendent, they must be objective.  If they are to be objective, they have to be unchanging - not simply jumping around as different cultures arise and fall, each with their own values.  We already know that we can look back in time to ancient Rome or across the seas, to different cultures, and find that they did things which are objectively wrong.  Therefore we need an account of this.  This account is that Yahweh holds certain attributes.  While I like arbitrary things like my own family and certain foods, Yahweh empathises with people (that is,  he is compassionate) and he gives things to people (that is, he is generous).  Yahweh will not change his mind, nor his attitudes - he is, in this sense, timeless.  Therefore, we can now say ‘That practice is wrong’, and when an ethical relativist says ‘Wrong in regards to what?’, we can say ‘In regards to god’s perfect moral character’, which is the standard by which we judge actions.

The problem is twofold.  Firstly, we can derive morals without this argument.  Secondly, this argument does not in fact give us a solid foundation for morals.  Yahweh may be unchanging, but even if he existed, this would not be enough.  Imagine for a moment that I find a rock and carve into it a set of injunctions - this rock now contains ‘Do not steal’, ‘Do not kill’, ‘Do not put anchovies nor pineapple on pizzas’, ‘Do not disrespect the rock’, et c.  Now imagine that the rock is timeless and unalterable - it will never change.  Is it a good foundation for ethics?  Certainly not, because it is arbitrary.

So we must ask - why should the character of a god be a good source for ethics?  You might say that it is because god is good.  But what is good?  How do we know that the character traits of Yahweh are in fact good?  Simply because they are Yahweh’s traits?  Because Yahweh simply is good?  It doesn’t really answer the question.

This is known as the Euthyphro dilemma, and there is no way around it because it is an exhaustive divide[2] - if something is good and X shows it to be good, then it is either good with or without X, or it is good because of X.  We cannot escape it by saying that Yahweh’s ‘character’ rather than his words make it good.  We cannot escape it by saying that Yahweh is perfect, because we then have to ask, ‘Perfect in regards to what?’, and if the answer is ‘Perfect in regards to everything, including morals’ then we are back at square one.

Gods, if they existed, could aid our moral epistemology, but never our moral ontology.  Without gods, not everything is permitted - and this is precisely the point.[3]

A Response to Malin Freeborn on the Moral Argument

Here at Apologetics UK, we seek to promote objective dialogue and constructive criticism as much as possible. Our attitude is that, if Christianity is true, it ought to be able to withstand any criticisms that are made of it. Similarly, if an argument we make is sound, it ought to be defensable. On the flip side of the coin, if Christianity is false, we don't want to adhere to its tenets anyway. It is for this reason that we are encouraging the occasional postings of guest articles by critics of Christianity, from a range of perspectives, in order to stimulate thought and critical reflection.

A couple weeks ago, I published an article by atheist philosophy graduate Malin Freeborn on the subject of the moral argument. His article was specifically a response to a lecture presented by Christian philosopher Stephen Meyer as part of the TrueU series.

Freeborn's article was disappointing in several respects, most notably his apparent conflation of moral ontology and moral epistemology, and his prolonged tangential detour into an irrelevant subject. I have dealt with Freeborn's arguments from Scripture in two appendices following the main text. Let's turn our attention to what he has to say.

A Guest Post From An Atheist On The Moral Argument

[Note: In the interests of promoting objective discussion and constructive criticism, we will be inviting the occasional guest post by a critic of Christianity. Our position is that, if Christianity is true, it should be able to withstand any criticism; if Christianity is not true, we don't want to believe it anyway. This piece, written by atheist philosophy graduate Malin Freeborn, concerns the moral argument for the existence of God. It is written as a response to this lecture presented by philosopher Stephen C. Meyer as part of the TrueU series. I invite reader participation in the comments thread and will be responding with a follow-up article in due course.]

Meyer’s Position

A god exists ⇔ objective moral standards exist

Meyer’s position is that we all live our lives as if we believed in real and objective ethical principles. He claims that the only way objective ethical principles could exist is if a god also exists. Meyer has a wishlist of things which a moral system requires, and claims that all of these require a god. So far so good - students of logic will note that the argument is valid as long as he claims that each of the items on the list require a god and all of them are required for morality. So, with this in mind let’s see the list:

The Wish List for an Ethical Framework

● There must be transcendental standard/ an objective standard of values.

● Humans must have free will.

● We need a reason to see humans as valuable & ‘qualitatively different’ from other forms of life.

The first on the list was a little ambiguous, as Meyer first states that he wants ‘transcendent values’ and secondly that he wants an objective standard of values. The two will have to be treated separately. As to ‘transcendent values’, the word ‘transcendent’ is ambiguous in the extreme. One definition is ‘beyond experience’, another is that it refers to a non-normal or supernormal property. Wikipedia alone gives 14 different areas in which the word is used. After a degree in Philosophy, including a good deal of Metaphysics, I still do not know what this word refers to, but suspect that it is one of many filler words, an empty word which refers to nothing at all. However, if the reader wishes a more charitable reading, they are free to use one and perhaps say that morality cannot be experienced in the manner which sunlight and music are experienced. If this is the case, then I agree, but of course if this is the case then it will not take much to give an account of morality as including transcendent values, if it contains any values at all. Nobody has ever claimed that morality is given by a normal sense.

Another reason to be suspicious of this statement is that Meyer so often slips in prepositions to his Philosophy. In this case he once requests that we have a transcendental standard of values ‘above us’. The man in the clouds has been rationally rejected, but he remains yet in the flavour of the language. If the reader finds me unfair then I request a translation of ‘above’ in reference to ‘transcendental values’.